Background
This paper is an academic exploration of the claim in a Wall Street Journal article: Bernanke: Unemployment Benefits Don't Keep Jobless Rate High 1 . The claim of the chairman of Federal
Reserve is that providing benefits to workers without a job likely doesn't contribute to the jobless rate or the high level of the long-term unemployed. According to this WSJ report, Bernanke's remark was a response to questions at the annual conference of the National Association for Business Economics. The original quote of the Federal Reserve Chairman's answer is "I would not attribute the extent of long-term unemployment or the very high level of unemployment to unemployment insurance."
Whether the provision and generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) increases unemployment has been the subject of much research (See Holmlund (1998) , Krueger & Meyer (2002) , and Fredriksson & Holmlund (2006) for recent reviews of the literature). Theory generally predicts that UI has two offsetting effects on unemployment, as the following section elaborates, leaving the net impact of UI an empirical issue for investigation.
Most of previous studies on the relationship between UI and unemployment were based on micro data. The use of data over countries or regions, observed at different points in time, is presumably a more promising way to estimate the equilibrium effects of variations in UI benefit generosity. The prototypical US study in this vein (e.g. Katz & Meyer, 1990) uses policy changes at the state level to identify the effects. However, this approach can be criticized because policy changes at the state level are endogenous with respect to the local business cycle, see for example Card & Levine (2000) and Lalive & Zweimüller (2004) . Card & Levine (2000) used variations in the national UI rules to estimate the effects at the regional level. Hence, the estimates should not suffer from the potential policy endogeneity hampering studies using regional policy changes for identification. The evidence suggests that benefit generosity increases unemployment and the estimates are robust across alternative specifications. The magnitudes involved are rather substantial and appear to be relatively high compared to estimates available elsewhere in the literature. The estimates suggest that an increase in the (actual) replacement rate of 5 percentage points contributes to increasing unemployment by 25 percent.
However Valletta and Kuang (2010) find that the effect in the downturn since 2008 appears quite small compared with other determinants of the unemployment rate. Their analyses suggest that extended UI benefits account for about 0.4 percentage point of the nearly 6 percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate over the past few years. This paper drafted by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco seems to provide some evidence to support Chairman
Bernanke's claim. Barro (2012) found that that UI benefit extensions (from 26 weeks to 99 weeks) raised the unemployment rate by 2.7 percentage point (from 6.8% to 9.5%). However, Rothstein (2011) finds that that UI benefit extensions (from 26 weeks to 99 weeks) raised the unemployment rate in early 2011 by only about 0.1-0.5 percentage points, much less than is implied by previous analyses. Howell and Azizoglu (2011) used a survey of studies on unemployment insurance's effect on employment to conclude that that unemployed who collected UI did not find themselves out of work longer than those who didn't have unemployment benefits; and that unemployed workers did not search for work more or reduce their wage expectations once their benefits ran out.
This paper aims to investigate: 1) do the two effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment rate at macro level hold predicted by theory hold: aggregate demand effect and incentive effect? 2) What is the net effect of public unemployment spending as percentage of GDP (rather than duration of UI) on three unemployment measures: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment rate; 3) what is the magnitude of this effect based on panel data of OECD nations. The public unemployment spending rate is a better measure of the scale of overall governmental financial assistance to unemployed people than duration of UI when the study purpose is on macro effect of this entitlement program.
The variables used in this paper, data source and time coverage of each variable are presented in table 1. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. Table 3 shows the correlation between unemployment outcomes and the unemployment spending rate (unem_exp). The correlations between total unemployment rate/long term unemployment rate and unem_exp are positive and statistically significant but that between youth unemployment rate and unem_exp is not statistically significant, suggesting that public unemployment spending affects youth less than adult. This may be related to the fact that the level of UI benefits depends upon previous earnings so that the disincentive effect of UI is smaller for youth than senior workers. The correlation between working hours (hours) and unem_exp is negative and strongly significant, supporting disincentive effect of the theory explained below. Although the correlation between log of per capita GDP (logypc) and unem_exp supports the aggregate demand effect of the theory, that between household consumption relative to GDP goes against the theory.
Theory
In theory, an increase in unemployment insurance has two effects. First is the disincentive effects. The second is the aggregate demand effect, as claimed by Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2010) .
Suppose employment supply and employment demand (n s and n d , respectively) are given by:
(1) n s = α0 + α1 UI + α2 w
Where UI is a measure of unemployment insurance payments, and w is the wage rate. According to the theory, α1 < 0, α2 > 0; β1 > 0; β2 < 0 . Hence, we are assuming some disincentive effects from UI, but stimulative effects from UI increasing consumption and hence demand for labor.
CBO(2012) supports these two effects, its explanation of (1) and (2) are (page 9):
• UI benefits increase incentives for workers who lose their job to look for work (by requiring them to do so in order to receive benefits) but reduce the incentives to accept a job offer.
• The UI system serves as an automatic economic stabilizer by supporting consumer spending when income falls, which in turn boosts aggregate economic activity.
Its overall conclusion on these two offsetting effects is "the positive impact of the additional UI benefits on the demand for goods and services-and thus on economic activity-has been significantly larger than the net impact on economic activity of the various other ways in which the increase in UI benefits has affected the economy (including greater incentives to search for a job and reduced incentives to accept a job offer). So it thinks that the effect of (2) total, long-term and youth unemployment rates, household consumption relative to GDP and per capita GDP.
CBO (2010) claimed that, "Households receiving unemployment benefits tend to spend the additional benefits quickly, making this option both timely and cost-effective in spurring economic activity and employment", so it is expected that household consumption as a percentage of GDP should rise due to this stimulative effect of UI and as a result so does to per capita income. CBO (2012) argues that UI benefits increase incentives for workers who lose their job to look for work because of eligibility requirement of UI but reduces the incentives to accept a job offer thus raising unemployment rate. CBO (2010) also admits that UI could dampen people's efforts to look for work. Actually both may be true. The net effect is, based on CBO's conclusion is the automatic stabilizer effect dominates incentive effect of UI. To test whether this conclusion has any empirical evidence to support is one motivation of this paper.
Another aim of the paper is to investigate the long term effect of unemployment public expenditure in terms of long term unemployment rate, which is the proportion of people who have been unemployed for 12 months or more among all unemployed. This may be more policy interest for decision makers.
Since one eligibility requirement of UI program is claimant is looking for job and has not given up job hunting, it is expected unemployment welfare spending will increase labor participation rate although some applicants may not be sincerely looking for jobs. The effect of unem_exp on labor participation rate will also be investigated in this paper.
The theory on the two effects of UI only concerns the behavior of individuals. UI programs may also impact on the behavior of business because of increases in taxes required to pay for the program. The possible effect of public unemployment welfare expenditure on business, particularly on investment rate will also be explored. This paper will test two effects in theory first and then develop a full-fledged model on unemployment outcomes and labor participation rate with more control variables before testing the effect on overall investment rate of business. adding two sets of dummy variables for country and year, respectively to the OLS regression.
The Model and Estimation Approach

The model for testing two effects in theory
Full model
The specification of the full-fledged model is:
where it y is the unemployment rate (total, youth, or long-term unemployment) or labor participation rate (LPR)for country i at time t. In all the models, public welfare expenditure on unemployment as a percentage of GDP (unem_exp) is the key variable of interest and possibly endogenous. To address this possible endogeneity, the approach of instrument variable (IV) estimation for panel data will be used. To establish validity of the IV used, IV strength test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Endogeneity test will be performed first to determine 1) if unem_exp is endogenous thus if IV estimation is necessary rather than LSDV estimation for panel data and 2) if IV is strong or weak. The details of these two tests are provided below in section 3.3. If DWH statistic is significant at 10% level but not at 5% level, then both LSDV and IV estimation results will be presented for comparison.
These two tests will be applied first for the tests on hypothesized disincentive effect and aggregate demand effect as explained in section 3.1 and then for the tests of full models that examine the economic impacts of unem_exp on unemployment outcomes (total, long-term and youth unemployment rates), labor participation rate and investment, the last of which is for testing the mechanism through which unem_exp impacts unemployment.
Test Endogeneity of public expenditure on unemployment
It is likely that changes in unemployment induce changes in public welfare spending on unemployment (unem_exp). Unemployment may have both positive and negative impacts on public expenditure on unemployment benefits. For the first one, when unemployment rate is high, there are more claimants of /applicants for UI benefits and government is more likely to extend UI coverage time to alleviate the pain of the unemployed, as a result, the welfare expenditure on unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP tends to rise. For the second one, higher unemployment is always accompanied by lower GDP growth, which is translated to lower tax income for government, which in turn may decrease welfare expenditure due to more scarce financial resources for re-allocation, one of which may be public expenditure on unemployment insurance provided by government. On the other hand, the effect of unemployment on UI expenditure may arise through another channel: higher unemployment and lower growth indicate bad economy, fewer job opportunities and lower income for working people, so it may be an incentive for heavier dependence on welfare benefits at the time of economic downturn, particularly unemployment insurance benefits. In short, there may exist reverse causality or feedback effect from unemployment rate to welfare expenditure on unemployment, which violates strict exogeneity assumption for the latter for Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation.
If this assumption fails, the consistency of FE estimates on unem_exp is questionable. The
Omitted variables, whose data is unavailable or unobservable to us, such as home ownership, may also be the source of endogeneity, as they may be correlated with unem_exp.
I apply classical Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to check whether welfare spending on unemployment is endogenous in our regressions for unemployment rates thus whether IV estimation is necessary. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test, which can easily be formed by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables and instrument variable(s), in a regression of the original model. The key requirement for this approach is that we can correctly identify all other strictly exogenous variables except suspicious endogenous variable(s) and we can find a valid IV, which has to be strongly correlated to welfare spending on unemployment but has no direct impact on unemployment outcomes(is uncorrelated with the unobservable error in regression). Death rate from road accidents presumably cannot affect unemployment and seems to have nothing to do with the omitted variables that affect unemployment rate, such as home ownership.
However, this rate may be related to welfare spending in this way: in welfare states with higher welfare expenditure by government and more generous welfare benefit programs (including unemployment insurance program), people tend to have more leisure time and slower life pace.
To prove this, a simple fixed effect model of hours on unem_exp is run where hours, as defined before, is average hours actually worked per year per person in employment. level (p value=0.0561). Since this p value is between 5% and 10%, both IV and LSDV regressions were run and results were compared. 5 show that public unemployment spending rate is not endogenous for all three unemployment rate measures but not endogenous for labor participation rate, we only include IVs for lagged dependent variable in the regressions for three unemployment rates but for the regression for labor participation, we add additional IV of road. Table 6 shows that public expenditure on unemployment has significantly positive effect on total unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate but no significant effect on youth unemployment rate, the latter of which is consistent with the expectation that because the level of UI benefits depends upon previous earnings so UI has not much effect on youth means among unemployed people, the proportion of those who were unemployed for more than one year will be decreased by 6.06%. Whether the magnitude of these two effects on total and long-term unemployment rates is attractive for policy makers to make policy change is up to the voters and politicians, but the economic effect of unemployment welfare spending on unemployment is definite: a significant positive effect on both the scale and duration of unemployment. Whether the magnitude of this effect has a substantial policy significance may be country-specific, however, the result gives strong evidence that the gaps in unemployment rates, particularly long-term unemployment rate between Europe and US in 1980s and 1990s may be partially explained by the differences in welfare spending on unemployment between USA and major western European countries. If combing other welfare expenditures, we expect the effect would be much larger.
The Results
The result on labor participation rate also supports our theoretical hypothesis: Unemployment welfare benefit can raise labor participation rate by preventing people from giving up job hunting. Every percentage point increase in unem_exp can increase labor participation rate by 1.29 percentage point.
The theory on the two effects of UI only concerns the behavior of individuals. To examine the impact of public unemployment spending on the behavior of business, I also run a regression of it on investment rate with control variables including inflation, long real interest rate and trade openness. The estimate of the coefficient of unemployment spending rate is -2.07 and significant at 5% level. Every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to GDP can decrease capital formation as a percentage of GDP by over two percentage point. The mechanism of this decrease may be because higher unemployment insurance tax used to fund UI increases business cost thus dampening incentive to make more investment or because people have less incentive to save when welfare benefits from entitlement programs are available and therefore business is more difficult to finance investments due to lower saving rate. Further empirical work is worthy to explore which mechanism is the most important.
The Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis
To check the robustness of our estimation results to specification change, I re-run the model (3) with two control variables changed and one control variable added: labor productivity growth replaced by multi factor productivity growth rate and terms of trade shock by the lagged value of terms of trade change. The added control variable is net migration rate, which is defined as the difference between immigration into and emigration from the country during the year per 1 000
inhabitants.
The motivation of adding this explanatory variable is during economic downturns, it is often the case that native workers blame high unemployment rate on immigrants. Simply put, they argue that immigrants are taking away jobs from natives. By adding net migration rate (migrate) as an additional control variable, we can test both whether the estimates of effects of public unemployment spending are robust to specification change and whether immigrants have any negative effect on unemployment measures.
The estimates of the coefficients for total and long-term unemployment rates in table 7 are very close to those in table 6 with only slight changes in magnitude. The magnitude is slightly higher for total unemployment rate (unemp) and slightly lower for long term unemployment rate. The estimate for unemp_exp is more significant now. With specification change, the effect of public unemployment spending rate on youth unemployment becomes significant at 5% level. We also note that all estimates for the coefficients of migration rate are significant and negative. Opposite to the widely heard accusation in press, immigrants are helping, rather than hindering, both the scale and duration of overall employment, which is consistent with the findings of Giovanni Peri (2010) and Vedder (1994) .
Discussion
To The data used in this paper has only covered public unemployment expenditure (% of GDP) up to year 2007 for USA, so we cannot see the effect of this UI program extension from our data.
However, the real data beyond the data used for econometric estimation in this paper validates the conclusion from this estimation, serving as a sort of quasi experiment as 2008 financial crisis was unexpected to most people.
Barro argued that one potential mechanism through which UI program impacts unemployment rate is "the distortions from the increases in taxes required to pay for the program". According to Rosen (2008) , the cost to the employer in increased taxes used to fund UI program is less than the benefits that would be paid to the employee upon layoff. The firm in this instance believes that it is more cost effective to lay off the employee, causing more unemployment than under perfect experience rating. Consequently, firm will decrease investment and economy shrinks.
This hypothesis is supported by our econometric finding in table 6 that every percentage point increase in unemployment public expenditure rate leads to 4.2 percentage point decrease in investment rate.
Our results show that the stimulative aggregate demand effect of public unemployment expenditure does not get support from the data while incentive effect hypothesized in theory has robust empirical support, only the impacts of UI program on supply side of labor market seems to be more important. However, the disincentive effect of UI program on business investment may also affect demand side of labor market negatively, worsening unemployment and economic growth. The help to individuals may not always be aligned with the interests of the society, policy makers need to take this into account to strike a balance for decisions involving economic trade-off.
Conclusion
Using panel data of public unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 34 OECD nations across year 1980-2010, I explore the effect of this ratio on three unemployment outcomes: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment, as well as labor participation rate and investment rate. After taking into account potential endogeneity of this ratio using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, I find the data does not support the hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance (UI) expenditure in theory but gives strong support for hypothesized disincentive effect in theory. The estimates indicate that every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to GDP leads to 0.9 to 1.1 percentage point increase in total unemployment rate and 4.5 to 4.7 percentage point increase in long term unemployment rate. The distortionary effect of UI program on business is also verified by an estimate that every percentage point increase in this unemployment spending rate is associated with about 2.1 percentage point decrease in investment rate. 2.93(0.0886) DWH endogeneity test for health outcome and labor participation is a regression of one unemployment measure (one of unemp, long_unem2, youth_unem2) on unem_exp, long_real_r, labor_prodg, trade_open, popd, inflation, dtot , dummy variables for each country , dummy variables for each year and the residual from the IV strength test. DWH endogeneity test for invrate is a regression of invrateon unem_exp, inflation, long_real_r , trade_open and the residual from the IV strength test.
All the regressions include both time and country fixed effects. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. LSDV=Least Square Dummy Variable estimation model for panel data; IV= Instrumental Variable estimation for panel data. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country.
